Dissertation Essays
The three complete dissertation essays are themed on exploring bilateral strategic behaviors under the context of the Law. The first essay focuses on the enforcement against counterfeits in China. It is primarily aimed to solve an unsettled question, whether Chinese law should disallow private enforcers against counterfeiting.
The other two chapters explore strategic behaviors in the context of eminent domain. The first essay examines the government's incentive to renege on the announced plan of taking, facing incumbent households' overinvestment in land for more compensation. The second essay explores Michelman's "demoralization cost" with formal economic models. Specifically, I evaluated whether resistance of the incumbent household forms effective economic threat when facing a compromising government or an unyielding government.
The other two chapters explore strategic behaviors in the context of eminent domain. The first essay examines the government's incentive to renege on the announced plan of taking, facing incumbent households' overinvestment in land for more compensation. The second essay explores Michelman's "demoralization cost" with formal economic models. Specifically, I evaluated whether resistance of the incumbent household forms effective economic threat when facing a compromising government or an unyielding government.
- "Should Chinese Law Disallow Counterfeit Hunters (Job Market Paper)
To discourage counterfeits and compensate affected consumers, the Chinese government enforces an over-compensation, stipulating that buyers should receive compensation greater than the price of the purchased items. The rule is exploited by “counterfeit hunters,” strategic consumers who specialize in detecting counterfeits and only purchase counterfeits to claim compensation. I use a simultaneous game to model to determine whether the law should enable counterfeit hunters. Results indicate that buyers who consume products indiscriminately suffer from counterfeit goods and that allowing counterfeit hunters to operate improves the expected surpluses of consumers and producers. However, if buyers consume authentic products but claim compensation for counterfeits, social welfare is further improved, without the need for counterfeit hunters. I also find that setting higher compensation levels decreases the amount of both counterfeit hunters and counterfeiters and improves social welfare.
- "When Under-Compensated Land Acquisition Arouses Resistance: Social Disobedience as a Response to Eminent Domain"
In the context of land acquisition, the government can behave strategically in a manner different from fiscal illusion, especially when its power is not effectively restricted. The strategic behavior I explore here is when the government acquires more land than they had previously announced. This strategy allows the government to adjust the acquisition contingently on what the affected household has invested. Using Kaldor-Hicks analysis, I find that the optimal policy for the government is to fully compensate the affected household in a way that is non-distortive (a lump sum) to its investment. The optimal policy does not change when the government implements the acquisition as pre-announced.
Resistance arises when the government takes the land without compensating the household “properly.” I show the above-mentioned compensation policy is optimal since it maximizes social welfare. Using a simultaneous game theory model that incorporates acquisition and resistance, I also find that the government, without the restriction of a benevolent statute or superior, will normally under-compensate and tolerate some resistance. But if there is such a benevolent restriction, full compensation is optimal, whether the government abides by the pre-announced scale or not.
Resistance arises when the government takes the land without compensating the household “properly.” I show the above-mentioned compensation policy is optimal since it maximizes social welfare. Using a simultaneous game theory model that incorporates acquisition and resistance, I also find that the government, without the restriction of a benevolent statute or superior, will normally under-compensate and tolerate some resistance. But if there is such a benevolent restriction, full compensation is optimal, whether the government abides by the pre-announced scale or not.
- "Resistance against Unjustly Compensated Land Acquisitions"
Undercompensated acquisitions arouse disputes, social dissents, and resistance. I incorporate this “demoralization” cost that is overlooked by the literature into a formalized Blume et al, (1984) model. I first explore a unilateral case where resistance is merely caused by undercompensation and then a bilateral case where the household can voluntarily add resisting efforts to pursue more compensation. Under the bilateral case, I investigate three scenarios with the sequential game: the government and the household move simultaneously, the government leads the sequential game while the household passively sustains economic loss if undercompensated, and the household leads the sequential game where the government compromises. I find the simultaneous game and the sequential game led by the government share the same outcome as the unilateral case: the household voluntarily adds no resisting efforts, but the government undercompensates. The latter deviates from the social optimum with no undercompensation. I propose a full-compensation rule to restore the social optimum. This rule needs to be paired with institutionalization that eliminates the household’s strategic addition of resisting efforts in the sequential game led by the household.
WORKING PAPERS
- “THE ‘YOUTUBE PREMIUM MEMBERSHIP’: AD-BLOCKING SERVICE INVOLVING TWO-SIDED MARKETS, MARKET SEGMENTATION AND QUALITY DIFFERENTIATION ”
- "THE CAUSAL EFFECT OF TAX AND LOCATION ON THE COMPETITIVENESS OF NBA TEAMS"
- “THE ACCUMULATION OF ATHLETIC COMPETENCY ACROSS TIME, A RECURSIVE APPLICATION OF THE CONFLICT MODEL”
PLANNED PROJECTS
- “EVALUATION OF THE ‘NO HAND-CHECKING RULE IN THE BASKETBALL GAMES: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO RULE CHANGES”
- “DOES WAIT TIME INCREASES CHANCE OF WINNING IN THE SUBSEQUENT ROUND -- AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NBA PLAYOFFS”
- "FROM LOW POST TO HIGH POST, AGING OR MONEY BALL -- A CAUSAL INFERENCE STUDY ON THE EVOLUTION IN PLAYSTYLES OF MODERN NBA POWER FORWARDS"